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THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN THE ERA OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: GUN RIGHTS
OR GUN REGULATION?
Saul Cornell & Justin Florence*
Reminiscing fifty years after the end of Reconstruction,
attorney Louis Post recalled the murder of Jim Williams, a
Freedman and captain in South Carolina's so-called "Negro
militia."'
The crime was so heinous it had become
permanently etched in Post's memory, and his description of
the event was chilling: "On the dangling corpse, those
despicable savages then pinned a slip of paper inscribed, as I
remember it, with these grim words 'Jim Williams gone to his
last muster."' 2 In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice
Stevens invoked this image as a cautionary reminder to
Justice Scalia and the other members of the Heller majority
that the militia purpose of the Second Amendment could not
be so easily cast aside without doing violence to the text and
history of this provision of the Bill of Rights.
Just two years after deciding Heller, the Court has taken
on another major gun rights case, McDonald v. City of
Chicago.4 This case will not only determine the future course
*Saul Cornell is Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham
University. Justin Florence is an Associate at O'Melveny & Myers LLP in
Washington, DC. He clerked for Judge Diana Gribbon Motz on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. He received his J.D. from Yale Law School
and a Master's Degree in History from Harvard. The authors thank Matthew
Shors, Anton Metlitsky, Micah Smith, Geoff Wyatt, Andrew Eveleth, and
students in the Harvard Law School Supreme Court clinic for research and
advice on the issues discussed in this article, and the members of the Santa
Clara Law Review for organizing this symposium.
1. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS
AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 184-85 (Oxford University

Press 2006).
2. Id.

3. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2842 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
4. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of America, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th
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of gun regulation in America, but it will provide an occasion
for the Roberts Court to shape its own approach to, and
establish its place in, history.
The issue before the Court-the relationship between the
Second and Fourteenth Amendments-is historically and
doctrinally complex. Because the statute at issue in Heller
regulated arms in the District of Columbia, a federal district,
the Court did not have occasion to resolve whether (and if so,
how) the Constitution's right to bear arms limits states and
their political subdivisions. The McDonald petitioners and
their allies argue that the gun control regulations in Chicago
and Oak Park, Illinois violate the right to bear arms
guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution.5 The petitioners' brief
draws heavily on historical materials, as do several amicus
curiae briefs supporting the constitutional challenge.6 These
briefs present a pro-gun rights version of history that is
plagued by half-truths, anachronisms, and ideological
distortion-one that bears little relationship to the actual
history of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
In McDonald, the Court must decide whether to correct
the historical and interpretive errors it made in Heller, or to
exacerbate them. And it must determine whether it will rely
on history in a way that is responsible and that best equips it
to grapple with the full complexity of the provisions that come
before it. If the Court does so, it will see that in the era
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
states regularly enacted robust firearms regulations to
protect the public safety, including bans on dangerous
weapons of the type before the Court.' The historical record
thus supports Chicago's position, not that of the petitioners.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: HELLER'S MISUSE OF HISTORY

The

Heller majority's

misuse

of

history

is

well

Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48
(2009).
5. Petitioners' Brief at 3-4, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (Nov.
16, 2009).
6. Id.; e.g., Brief for Academics for the Second Amendment as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (Nov. 23,
2009); Brief for Respondents the Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of America, Inc. et al. in
Support of Petitioners, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (Nov. 16,
2009) [hereinafter Brief for the NRA].
7. See infra Part III.
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documented.' Although the Court's opinion is couched in an
originalist veneer, Heller's use of historical materials has
drawn fire from historians and constitutional scholars across
Reva Siegel, for
the contemporary political spectrum.9
example, notes that Justice Scalia's logic appears to exclude
military weapons but give preferred status to handguns.'° If
one applied the logic of Justice Scalia's opinion during the
Founding era itself, it would seem to give greater
constitutional protection to the pistols used by Alexander
Hamilton and Aaron Burr in their ill-fated duel than to a
musket owned by a Concord Minuteman-an outcome that is
hard to reconcile with the original vision of a well-regulated
militia. Pistols were not standard military issue for the
eighteenth-century militiamen (apart from the horsemen's
pistol carried by mounted soldiers and the pistols carried by
some officers), but muskets certainly were." This fact is hard
to square with the Heller Court's decision to give more
constitutional protection to civilian guns than to militia
weapons.
Perhaps the most significant interpretive error of the
Scalia's
proclaimed
Justice
Heller
majority-given
textualism-was its ahistorical approach to reading the text
of the Second Amendment. Justice Scalia used nineteenthcentury interpretive sources to support making the Second
Amendment's preamble subservient to the statement of the
right. The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." 2 Rather than construe the second clause in light
8. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun
Control, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 32-33; J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253
(2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold,
122 HARv. L. REV. 246, 260, 263-64 (2008).
9. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); see Saul Cornell,
Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 639-40 (2008).
10. See Siegel, supra note 9, at 193.
11. New York's militia law was typical; it required militia men to obtain a
musket or rifle and the "Captain of the Troop of Horse" to certify that his men
had either a "carbine" or set of "good pistols." See Act of Mar. 11, 1780, ch. 55,
1780 N.Y. Laws 237.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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of the preamble, as the Founding generation would have,
Justice Scalia adopted a nineteenth-century interpretive
approach. He interpreted the latter part of the Second
Amendment first, effectively rewriting the Amendment and
undoing the work of the First Congress, which had
consciously rewritten the text to place the right to bear arms
after the militia clause. 13 This upends the claim that the
opinion's application of originalism is a neutral interpretive
method.
Justice Scalia has famously claimed that we do not have
a living Constitution, but rather a dead one. 4 It might be
more apt to describe the majority's interpretation in Heller as
something akin to a constitutional etch a sketch. Like the
popular children's toy, inconvenient fragments magically
disappear and then miraculously reappear at the whim of the
interpreter. In Heller, the preamble effectively vanishes and
only reappears after the Court has interpreted the meaning of
This "Cheshire Cat Rule of
the right to bear arms.
Construction"-now you see the preamble, now you don'trepresents a surrealist turn in constitutional interpretation.15
Indeed, this approach prompted Justice Stevens to wryly note
in dissent that this method was not how courts typically read
texts.
The Court today tries to denigrate the importance of this
clause of the Amendment by beginning its analysis with
the Amendment's operative provision and returning to the
preamble merely "to ensure that our reading of the
operative clause is consistent with the announced
purpose." That is not how this Court ordinarily reads
such texts, and it is not how the preamble would have
been viewed at the time the Amendment was adopted. ' 6
13. On the drafting of the Amendment, see Jack N. Rakove, The Second
Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 158
(2001).
14. All Things Considered, Scalia Vigorously Defends a "Dead"Constitution,
NPR, Apr. 28, 2008, http'J/www.npr.orgttemplates/story/story.php?storyId=
90011526.
15. On Heller's use of a "Cheshire Cat Rule of Construction," see Saul
Cornell, Heller, New Originalism,and Law Office History: "Meet the New Boss,
Same as the Old Boss," 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1101-06 (2009) (discussing
orthodox Blackstonian modes of construction and contrasting them with Scalia's
approach).
16. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2826 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Justice Scalia defended his approach to interpreting the
Second Amendment by relying on rules of interpretation
drawn from nineteenth-century treatises written many
decades after the Founding era.' 7 In this version of history,
presumably, Washington Irving's Rip Van Winkle would have
awoken to find nothing changed in America after his long
slumbers."8 Historian Gordon Wood begins his magisterial
contribution to the Oxford History of America with Irving's
classic tale."9 The story of Rip Van Winkle captured the
profound changes that had swept over America in the period
between the Revolution and the Jeffersonian era. Wood's
characterization seems apt: "In a few short decades
Americans had experienced a remarkable transformation in
their society and culture, and, like Rip and his creator, many
wondered what had happened and who they really were."2"
The Federalist and Jeffersonian eras were deeply
contentious periods in American constitutional life, and the
rules governing the interpretation of constitutional texts were
among the most bitterly contested questions that jurists faced
in the new nation. 2 ' These fierce debates extended to the use
of preambles in legal texts.2 2 The most high profile examples
of this conflict occurred within the context of the battle over
the Alien and Sedition Acts. 23 There, the Federalists used an
expansive reading of preambles to justify the Acts, which led
to a backlash against such latitudinarian constructions.24
Even more illuminating is an 1807 opinion of the New
Jersey Supreme Court, which focused precisely on the proper
mode of interpreting preambles-a case not mentioned by
17. See id. at 2789-90 & nn.3-4.
18. Washington Irving, Rip Van Winkle: A Posthumous Writing of Diedrich
Knickerbocker, in HEATH ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 941 (concise
ed. 2004).
19. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 1 (Oxford University Press 2009).
20. Id. (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 400-68.
22. Id. at 95-173.
23. OBSERVATIONS ON THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 25 (John Colerick
printer, Telegraphe 1799); An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
Against the United States, ch. 74, 1798 Stat. 596 (1848).
24. For a more detailed discussion of the constitutional struggle over
preambles, see David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a
Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written
Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295, 1299-1307
(2009).
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Justice Scalia or Eugene Volokh, the scholar whose work
informed Heller's reading of preambles. 25 The New Jersey
Court addressed the suggestion "that the enacting clause [of a
legal text] being couched in clear and positive terms, must be
literally obeyed, without regard to the preamble;" and "that a
preamble cannot control the plain enacting clause of a
statute, but it is only called in when the intention of the
Although Justice
legislature is doubtfully expressed."2 6
Scalia claimed this was a standard interpretive approach at
the Founding, the New Jersey Court squarely rejected it. The
majority opinion invoked Blackstone's authority, particularly
his paramount rule for interpreting statutes:
But I confess, I cannot find either in the authorities cited,
or in many others which I have carefully searched, any
thing which does away that great fundamental principle,
that the clear reason and spirit of a law should govern in

its construction. In 1 Blac. 59, we find it laid down that,
"The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will
of the Legislature is, by exploring
his intentions at the
27
time when the law was made."
The dissenting opinion, in contrast, supported Justice Scalia's
view, claiming that:
It appears to me, to be a settled principle of law, that the
preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute,
in cases where the enacting part is expressed in clear,
unambiguous terms; but in case any doubt arises on the
enacting part, the preamble may be resorted to, to explain
it, and show the intention of the law maker. The enacting
part of this statute is clear and explicit; there is no
ambiguity on the face of it. Shall we then go out of the
enacting part, which is clear and intelligible, and resort to
the preamble, to create an ambiguity, and then have
recourse to
the same preamble, to explain this
28
ambiguity?
In contrast to Justice Scalia's Heller opinion, though, this
New Jersey high court dissent written by Justice Pennington
was conversant with the relevant English authorities and
25. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 793 (1998); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 n.4 (2008).
26. Lloyd v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 197, 202 (1807) (quoting the contentions of one
of the parties).
27. Id. at 202-03.
28. Id. at 210 (Pennington, J., dissenting).
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noted that they were divided on the appropriate use of
preambles. The restrictive view of preambles advocated by
Lord Cowper-the one adopted by Justice Scalia-had been
articulated at the start of the eighteenth-century but rejected
at the end of the century by "Lord Chief Baron PARKER and
Lord HARDWICKE, in the case of Ryal v. Rowles."2 9 The
New Jersey dissent's preference for Cowper's views over those
of Hardwicke are enlightening, and show how much of an
outlier Justice Scalia's approach would have been at the time
of the Founding. The dissent explained:
Preambles are often very loosely drawn, and not very
minutely attended to, by the members of the Legislature,
in giving their assent to a law. The enacting clause being
reasonable and proper, is, in all ordinary cases, sufficient
to gain their approbation and assent to an act. But may
not the Legislature have had a further intent, than what
is expressed in the preamble?3"
To justify using the Pennington's dissent over Rossell's
majority view of preambles, then, one would have to assume
that the First Congress had written the Second Amendment
without much thought or attention. But that is not the case;
the Framers carefully considered the text of the Amendment.
The New Jersey Supreme Court case was not alone in
instructing that a preamble cannot be set aside when seeking
the intent of the legislator. Justice John Jay, riding circuit in
a 1790s case, stated the Founding era's view of the role of
preambles in unambiguous terms: "A preamble cannot annul
enacting clauses; but when it evinces the intention of the
legislature and the design of the act, it enables us, in cases of
two constructions, to adopt the one most consonant to their
intention and design."3 ' Jay's advice seems especially useful
given that the court was trying to determine two different
constructions of the phrase "bear arms."32
Although Justice Scalia claimed the mantle of
originalism, his approach rejected the Founding Era's
preferred method for handling preambles in favor of
interpretive techniques at odds with that practice. Citing
nineteenth-century treatises to support this interpretive
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 211 (Pennington, J., dissenting).
Id. (Pennington, J., dissenting).
Jones v. Walker, 13 F. Cas. 1059, 1065 (C.C.D. Va. 1800).
Id.
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move is the worst sort of "law office history"-cherry-picking
sources and ignoring the full historical context. 3 Put simply,
Heller demonstrates that Justice Scalia's version of
originalism is not the neutral interpretive tool he fancies it to
34
be.
The Heller majority's faux originalism is particularly
troubling because it uses a purportedly neutral method to
cloak a profoundly anti-democratic decision. It is important
to recall that the Heller Court struck down laws enacted by
the democratically elected representatives of the District of
Columbia, and did so through a novel reading of the Second
Amendment contrary to long-standing precedent. Moreover,
the Court was not defending an insular minority, but rather a
"self proclaimed majority" that has used the political process
to successfully forward its agenda across the nation.3 5 As
Cass Sunstein has noted, Justice Scalia's Heller opinion
seems to represent a form of living constitutionalism driven
by a powerful popular constitutionalist support for gun
rights.36 The problem for Justice Scalia was that Washington
is one locality in which popular support favored gun control,
not gun rights. But rather than acknowledge that the Court
was striking down the democratic law because of the
majority's own ideological views on the issue, the majority
purported to apply a neutral theory.
II. THE IRONIES OF THE PRO-MCDONALD BRIEFS

The briefs filed on behalf of the McDonald petitioners
evidence the same tendency toward law office history found in
the Heller majority's opinion. 7 If good history forms a rich
tapestry drawn from a variety of different sources, this
The
results-oriented exercise looks rather different.
the
Court
with
a
petitioners and their amici have presented
33. For a useful discussion of the problem of law office history in recent
legal scholarship, see Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of
History in Law, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 479 (2008).
34. See Wilkinson, supra note 8.
35. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, Identity Politics and the Second Amendment,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 549 (2004); Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox:
The InstitutionalOrigins of the Great American Gun War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
681 (2004). Without a gun census, it is impossible to tell if the majority of
American households actually own firearms.
36. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 265-67.
37. See discussion infra Part I.
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flat monochromatic version of the past, drained of its
complexity.
According to this simplistic account, the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a constitutional right to
possess any arms that could possibly be used for self-defense,
and it precludes the states from enacting reasonable gun
regulations--even regulations that are non-discriminatory, do
not interfere with the militia, and serve the purpose of
protecting the public from harm.
The McDonald petitioners' and their amici's arguments
are profoundly ahistorical.38 Second Amendment scholarship
has often been the worst sort of law office history, packaged
in originalist rhetoric. Rather than faithfully portray the
Founders' world, it has conjured up a mirror image of the
world it purports to represent-a carnivalesque inversion of
reality 3 9-in
which the Dissent of Pennsylvania's AntiFederalist Minority matters more than the debates of the
First Congress that actually wrote the Second Amendment.4 0
The use of history by the McDonald petitioners and their
amici fails on its own terms. Moreover, as explained in Part
III, these parties entirely ignore the dominant understanding
of the relationship between states and gun regulation in the
era following adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment-in
particular, the fact that states had broad power to enact nondiscriminatory firearms regulations to protect the public
safety. 4 '
A. The FoundingEra's Self-Defense Theory Versus the
Modern Gun Rights Theory
One historically flawed aspect of the majority opinion in
Heller is the claim that the Second Amendment was intended
or understood to effectively constitutionalize the common law
right of self-defense. 42 These two rights (to bear arms in a
militia, and bear a gun for personal self-defense) were legally
38.

See generally ROBERT SPITZER, SAVING THE CONSTITUTION FROM

LAWYERS: HOW LEGAL TRAINING AND LAW REVIEWS DISTORT CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING (2008); see also Jack N. Rakove, Confessions of an Ambivalent
Originalist,78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1346, 1354-55 (2003).
39. Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
387, 405-07 (2003).

40. Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22 LAW &
HIST. REV. 161 (2004).

41. See infra Part III.
42. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 (2008).
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distinct in the Founding era. Certainly, some proposals were
made to constitutionalize the right to self-defense, including
Jefferson's alternative model for the Virginia Declaration of
Rights and the rejected alternatives framed by two
Massachusetts towns during the debate over the state's 1780
Constitution.4 3 By 1790 the most forward-looking legal
thinkers, such as James Wilson, had started to think about
the issue in more individualistic terms, yet it would take
several decades before this view gained a foothold in
American law. Once this new theory took root, it provided an
alternative to the traditional common law understanding of
self-defense embodied in eighteenth-century Anglo-American
law. 44
The debates in state constitutional conventions and
legislatures during the decades following the adoption of the
of
which include the waves
Second Amendment,
constitutional revision that swept across the nation
throughout the nineteenth century, demonstrate that by the
middle of the nineteenth century two opposing views of the
right to bear arms had gained currency in American law.4 5
Indeed, the two competing visions of the right to bear armsone militia-based and the other rooted in the right of private
self-defense-generated two opposing constitutional visions in
antebellum American jurisprudence, a fact revealed by the
radically different holdings in the antebellum cases of State v.
Buzzard and Bliss v. Commonwealth.4
By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,
constitutional experts (including those cited by the Heller
In his comprehensive
majority) recognized this divide.
review of this body of law, John Foster Dillon, an eminent
late nineteenth-century legal authority, recognized that
43. OSCAR HANDLIN

& MARY HANDLIN, THE POPULAR SOURCES OF

POLITICAL AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION

OF 1780, at 574, 624 (Harvard University Press 1966); Library of Congress,
Virginia Colonial Convention, August 1774, Declaration of Rights,
(last
http-//memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mtj: l:temp/-ammemNENu::
visited Apr. 14, 2010).
44. CORNELL, supra note 1, at 148-55.
45. Id. at 137-166; Cornell, supra note 40, at 161.
46. Compare Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822) (declaring that
Kentucky's concealed-weapons ban conflicted with the state constitution),
superseded by state constitutionalamendment, KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XI, § 25,
with State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 21 (1842) (upholding arms regulation statute
against constitutional challenge).
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competing paradigms existed.4 7 Dillon shared the view of
another celebrated legal theorist, Joel Prentiss Bishop, who
argued that the more limited militia-based conception of
arms-bearing articulated in Buzzard was the dominant
paradigm.4" Both Dillon and Bishop recognized it was beyond
dispute that the more expansive individual right discussed in
Bliss was not (yet) the orthodox view in American law.49
Although the militia purpose of the Second Amendment
and similar state arms-bearing provisions controlled the
meaning of the Amendment, this is not to say that
Americans, including leading commentators, did not believe
in a right of individual self-defense. Neither Bishop nor
Dillon would have doubted that such a right was well
established under common law and that the right included
the liberty to use firearms or any other item of property
legally possessed. Dillion's discussion of this notion was
particularly thoughtful.
He argued that society may
extensively regulate the right of self-defense, but cannot
abrogate it. 50 Echoing the ruling in Andrews v. State,5' an
influential Reconstruction-era
case, Dillon confidently
declared that "every good citizen is bound to yield his
preference as to the means [of self-defense] to be used, to the
demands of the public good."5 2 Dillon also explained that
each state might "regulate the bearing of arms in such a
manner as it may see fit, or restrain it altogether."" And, as
discussed in Part III, the states did just that in the era
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.54
Part of the problem with the modern gun rights theory is
that it has effectively misconstrued the connection between
the right to have guns and the right to keep and bear arms.
For modern gun rights advocates, the Constitution protects
an individual right to have guns for self-defense, which
makes it possible to have a well-regulated militia. The
47. John Foster Dillon, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Public and
PrivateDefense, 1 CENT. L.J. 259 (1874).
48. See generally JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL

LAW (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1868) (1856).
49. Dillon, supra note 47, at 286.
50. Id.
51. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871).
52. Dillon, supra note 47, at 286.
53. Id. at 296.
54. See infra Part III.
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Founders had the opposite view: the necessity of having a
well-regulated militia meant that the people had the right to
have certain weapons, which they were entitled to use for self
defense, under common law and subject to reasonable state
regulation.55
B. The ContinuingRelevance of the Militia in the
Reconstruction Era
To sustain their self-defense theory, gun rights advocates
have once again tried to erase the first clause of the Second
Amendment by falsely claiming that Republicans in the era of
the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption had little interest in
gun regulation and had abandoned their belief that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms was linked to
participation in the militia. For example, one brief filed in
McDonald argues that by the middle of the nineteenth
century the original militia-based view of the Amendment
had largely disappeared and been supplanted by an
individual rights conception of arms-bearing. 6 That brief
does not come to terms with the leading legal authorities
writing during that period and cannot be reconciled with the
relevant scholarly literature on American constitutional
development in this era.
Historians have devoted an
enormous amount of energy to charting the bumpy and
disjointed transformation of American politics from a civic
republican culture to a more liberal one. 57
No serious
historian would doubt that over the course of the nineteenth
55. For a clear statement of the gun rights view, see Don B. Kates Jr., The
Second Amendment And The Ideology Of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENT.
87 (1992). Rather than approach the right of self defense in a rigorous
historical fashion, Kates plucks quotes out of context, cherry-picking snippets
from a variety of philosophers from Plato to the Founders. The essay shows
little historical understanding of early modern political thought, eighteenthcentury social contract theory, or Anglo-American common law.
56. See Brief for Academics for Second Amendment, supra note 6. The table
of authorities for this brief relies largely on publications of pro-gun rights
activists such as Clayton Cramer, David Hardy, Stephen Halbrook, and Dave
Kopel. See id. at vi-x. Indeed, the brief cites a forthcoming article written by
one of the authors of the brief that appears to have been written with the idea of
influencing the Court in McDonald. See id. at 12 n.15. The brief therefore
effectively cites itself for authority.
57. See Festa, supra note 33; Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career
of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 30-34 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue
and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 551
n.23 (1986).
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century a more democratic and individualistic culture
gradually emerged in the United States.5 8 But this does not
mean that the older vision was obliterated.
The Second Amendment presents no exception to this
general rule.
The dominant understanding of the
Amendment in the eighteenth century was unquestionably
civic republican. 59
A more liberal, individualistic, and
ultimately democratic conception of arms-bearing emerged at
the end of the eighteenth century, and developed most fully in
the early decades of the nineteenth.6" It is, however, far too
simplistic to assert that one view simply supplanted the
other. The notion that the Second Amendment right to bear
arms had been decoupled from the militia purpose of the
Amendment would have shocked most of the leading legal
minds of the late nineteenth century.
One leading authority writing in the late nineteenth
century, John Norton Pomeroy, construed the Second
Amendment using the Blackstonian method adopted by
Justice Stevens and eschewed by Justice Scalia in Heller.61
He observed that the meaning of the Second Amendment was
to be gleaned from its preamble, noting that "[aill such
provisions, all such guaranties, must be construed with
reference to their intent and design."6 2 He was insistent on
this point:
The object of this clause is to secure a well-armed militia.
It has always been the policy of free governments to
dispense, as far as possible, with standing armies, and to
rely for their defence, both against foreign invasion and
domestic turbulence, upon the militia. Regular
armies
63
have always been associated with despotism.
While these sentiments are sure to please modem
proponents of gun control, Pomeroy's views are not easily
assimilated to the simple dichotomies of modem gun politics.
58. WOOD, supra note 19, at 701-38 (suggesting that this change had taken
place by the second decade of the nineteenth-century). For more on the
changing view of the right to bear arms, see CORNELL, supra note 1.
59. See sources cited supra note 57.
60. WOOD, supra note 19, at 701-38.
61. See generally JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

3d ed. 1875).
62. Id. at 152.
63. Id.

(New York, Hurd and Houghton

1056

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:50

Pomeroy continued to believe that the Amendment was
defined by its militia purpose, but he viewed that purpose in
expansive terms. Thus, Pomeroy was equally quick to point
out that "a militia would be useless unless the citizens were
enabled to exercise themselves in the use of warlike
weapons"I-a sentiment more likely to bring a smile to the
faces of modern gun rights advocates.
Pomeroy was hardly alone in championing this
understanding of the Second Amendment; Joel Prentiss
Bishop articulated a similar view. After noting that state
authority over the manner of carrying weapons was extensive
(including the regulation of open carry and concealed carry),
Bishop went on to discuss the more limited scope of the right
to keep and bear arms. Bishop was emphatic that the right
only protected military arms and, even then, only when used
in a "military way. " "
Contrary to claims of gun rights
advocates, the dominant view of the Second Amendment in
the late nineteenth-century continued to be shaped by the
preamble.66
C. The IncorporationConundrum: What Did the Fourteenth
Amendment Prohibit?
Much of the recent academic scholarship on the
Fourteenth Amendment, particularly as espoused by those
supporting full incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the
states, has stressed its abolitionist origins.
While this
intellectual genealogy is important, it is not the only
significant historical tradition relevant to the Fourteenth
Amendment.67 Republicans were also heirs to an older Whig
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
BISHOP, supra note 48, at 75.
Id. at 75-76.
For pro-incorporation arguments, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE

SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57-

91, 215-20 (3d prtg. 2001). For the opposing argument, see WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 114-24 (1988). The most measured and even-handed
evaluation of the evidence and scholarship to date concludes that the evidence
for total incorporation of the Bill of Rights fails to meet any reasonable
historical standard of proof. Of course, depending on which theory of
originalism the Court utilizes, the lack of compelling historical evidence for a
broad consensus on incorporation among the framers, ratifiers, and the general
public may not pose a serious bar to incorporation of the Second Amendment.
Indeed, given the Court's "new originalist" methodology employed in Heller
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vision of a well-regulated state.
And while a more
individualistic conception of arms-bearing had taken root
among the most radical wing of the abolitionist movement,
this was not the view of more mainstream Republicans6 8who
remained committed to the idea of well regulated society.
Although the scholarly pendulum has shifted noticeably
toward incorporation in recent years, no clear consensus has
emerged on this issue. Few contemporary scholars would
defend the extreme anti-incorporationist views of Charles
Fairman or Raoul Berger.69
Moreover, some points of
agreement have emerged in this debate. If the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to be gleaned from the intent
of its primary architects, as evidenced by utterances made in
the Congressional Globe, the case for something like
incorporation is strong.7 0 The problem, however, becomes
increasingly complex if one moves beyond Bingham and
Howard's speeches in Congress. The most recent effort to
tally up the views of those Congressmen who spoke on the
issue concluded that the case for incorporation remains
inconclusive at best. 7' As one moves beyond congressional
debate to try to survey the public understanding of the
Amendment at the time of its adoption, the evidence becomes
less clear, more fragmentary, and even more contradictory.7 2
The connection between the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments is even more complex. Gun rights advocates
claim that the right to bear arms was the pre-eminent right
sought by supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even
allowing for the hyperbole that often appears in amicus
briefs, such a simplistic claim strains credulity. While the

there are almost no constraints on what the Court might do because any
evidence, no matter how un-representative, can be used to construct an original
public meaning argument.
68. RONALD M. LABB9 & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES:
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 230

(2003).
69. For an explanation of these views, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 155-89
(2d ed. 1997), and Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949).
70. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 5, at 24-26.
71. See George Thomas, III, The Riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Response to ProfessorWildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627 (2007).
72. BERGER, supra note 69, at 155-89; Fairman, supra note 69.
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outrages of the Black Codes, including the selective
3
disarmament of Blacks, were widely reported in the North,1
there is almost no evidence to support the contention that
this was a general concern during public debate over the
Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, considering that Bingham
and others were mercilessly attacked by Democrats who
conjured up a host of horrors (including miscegenation) that
7 4 it
would follow the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption,
would have been political suicide to champion the rights of
gun toting African-Americans to Northern or Midwestern
audiences. Indeed, when Bingham took to the stump to sell
the Fourteenth Amendment he stressed that the purpose of
Section One was to "secur[e] equal political rights to all
natural born or naturalized Citizens."75
Significantly, even Bingham expressly affirmed that the
new Amendment would not diminish the powers of the states
and would maintain the balance of power within the federal
system. He expressly declared that the state would continue
to be responsible for all issues of "local administration and
personal security."76 As described below, states had regulated
weapons to protect public safety in the years leading up to the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Bingham's public remarks seem
a clear indication that he did not intend the new Amendment
to alter that practice. Striking down a local gun control law
seems hard to reconcile with Bingham's own view that the
goal of Section One was to secure equal rights and preserve
state power to protect and regulate matters relevant to
personal security.77
73. See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 25-27, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (Nov. 23,
2009) [hereinafter Brief of Constitutional Law Professors]; Petitioners' Brief,
supra note 5, at 11; Brief for the NRA, supra note 6, at 14.
74. James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435 (1985).
75. John Bingham, Speech, in CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 1867.
76. Id.

77. For two other speeches by Bingham which stress equal rights, not
incorporation, as the essence of Section One, see John A. Bingham, Politics in
Ohio (Aug. 8, 1866), in CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, Aug. 10, 1866, and John A.
Bingham, The Constitutional Amendment (Aug. 24, 1866), in CINCINNATI
COMMERCIAL, Aug. 27, 1866. For a useful summary of the scholarship on the
public debate over Section One, see Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment
Plumbing after Heller: Of Incorporation,Standards of Scrutiny, Well-Regulated
Militias and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1 (2009). Rosenthal
concludes that even the most ardent advocates for total incorporation have not
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It is not just Bingham who is hard to fit into the gun
rights incorporation paradigm.
Even among those who
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment had incorporated
the right to bear arms, the theory of incorporation they
advanced does not fit into the simple dichotomous model of
the Second Amendment
that dominated
pre-Heller
scholarship. Nor can this vision of incorporation be easily
reconciled with Heller's holding itself. Consider the view
presented in the National Rifle Association (NRA) brief and a
brief filed by Constitutional Law Professors in McDonald.7"
These briefs describe reactions from Congressmen concerned
that the Black Codes in Mississippi, South Carolina, and
elsewhere explicitly discriminated against the rights of
freedmen and other African-Americans, preventing them
from possessing the types of arms that others were permitted
to own. Petitioners and the NRA, for example, cite an order
from General Sickles, issued in January 1866, to suspend the
South Carolina Black Codes.79
Both quote the order
selectively, however, cutting off the provision mid-sentence.
Read in full, the order affirms: "The constitutional rights of
all loyal and well-disposed inhabitants to bear arms will not
be infringed; nevertheless this shall not be construed to
sanction the unlawful practice of carrying concealed weapons,
nor to authorize any person to enter with arms on the
80
premises of another against his consent."
The same provision further provides that "no disorderly
person, vagrant, or disturber of the peace, shall be allowed to
bear arms."8 ' The non-discrimination principle of the Sickles
order was thus entirely consistent with reasonable safety
regulation. Nor was the right to bear arms one that all
individuals could claim even in the era of the Fourteenth
Amendment's adoption. Rather, the right was limited to loyal
Americans able to demonstrate some permanent attachment
to the community by showing, for instance, that they were not
vagrants (i.e., they either held property or were gainfully
been able to muster a compelling case that total incorporation was widely
understood to be the public understanding of Section One. Id. See generally
Thomas, supra note 71.
78. See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 73; Brief for the
NRA, supra note 6.
79. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 5; Brief for the NRA, supra note 6.
80. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 908-09 (1866).
81. Id.
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employed). Thus, during this time, the right to bear arms
was not universal and was indeed subject to far greater
restrictions than were core First Amendment freedoms,
including some forms of prior restraint that would not have
been allowable for speech. 82
Likewise, the NRA and Constitutional Law Professors
both place great emphasis on the second Freedman's Bureau
Bill, which Congress enacted in response to the
discriminatory laws enacted and enforced by Southern
States.8 3 But, that bill focused on barring state action that
discriminated against African-Americans.
The relevant
provision protected the freedmen's right:
[T]o have full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security,
and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate,
real and personal, including the constitutional right to
bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the
citizens of such State or district without
respect to race or
84
color or previous condition of slavery.
Although petitioners' amici highlight the portion of this
provision noting a "right to bear arms," they ignore the text
surrounding that phrase, viz. "equal benefit of all laws" and
"without respect to race or color or previous condition of
slavery."8 5
Likewise, other legislation enacted by the
Reconstruction Congress targeted discriminatory state action.
For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which the
Fourteenth Amendment was meant to constitutionalize, s6
explicitly enacted an antidiscrimination rule.8 7
Senator
Trumbull reasoned that the Act would "in no manner
interfere[] with the municipal regulations of any State which

82. By rejecting Justice Breyer's balancing test, the Heller Court seemed to
come close to treating the Second Amendment as though it were structurally
the same as the First Amendment's protection for political speech. Although
political speech triggers strict scrutiny, other types of speech do not. Of course
as Winkler notes, most provisions of the Bill of Rights are not precluded from
employing balancing tests.
Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 706-26 (2007).
83. See Brief of the Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 73, at 29;
Brief for the NRA, supra note 6, at 12.
84. Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77.
85. Id.; see also Rosenthal, supra note 77, at 73.
86. See, e.g., Bond, supra note 74, at 444.
87. See Rosenthal, supra note 77, at 58-59.
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protects all alike in their rights of person and property."8 8
The NRA also relies heavily on Pomeroy's treatise, 9 but
ignores its clear statement of the Amendment's nondiscrimination principle. Pomeroy observed that if a state
statute provided that "certain classes of the inhabitants-say
negroes-are required to surrender their arms," the federal
Bill of Rights offered no relief.9 0 The "first section" of the
Fourteenth Amendment "now pending before the people,"
however, "would give the nation complete power to protect its
citizens against local injustice and oppression." 91 Indeed,
Pomeroy's explication of how Section One would function to
protect rights merits closer scrutiny. Pomeroy posited a
scenario in which a state enacts a discriminatory law
Interestingly, he further posited
disarming Freedmen.92
another crucial fact ignored by the NRA brief: not only did the
hypothetical state enact a discriminatory act, but its
constitution also contained an arms-bearing provision.9 3 If
Pomeroy believed that the right to bear arms was a privilege
and immunity of citizenship or an element of substantive due
process liberty, there would have been no need to construct
In the absence of a
the fact pattern in this manner.
discriminatory law and a state arms-bearing provision there
would have been no means for the Fourteenth Amendment to
trigger federal intervention. The reason for this is evident in
Pomeroy's forceful statement that the individual state's police
powers remained undiminished after the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pomeroy was emphatic on this point, declaring
that the Amendment would not "interfere with any of the
rights, privileges, and functions which properly belong to the
individual states." 94 Among those rights was the power to
regulate "dangerous" weapons.
Indeed, Pomeroy's view-that the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state statutes directed at
"certain classes of inhabitants," but did not prohibit
reasonable and neutral regulations aimed at protecting the

88. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1761 (1866).
89. Brief for the NRA, supra note 6, at 17, 46.
90. POMEROY, supra note 61, at 150.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 151, quoted in Brief for the NRA, supra note 6, at 17.
POMEROY, supra note 61, at 150.
Id.
Id. at 151.
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public 9 5-also reflected the view of the Reconstruction
Congress. Senator Morrill (R-Me.), for example, emphasized
that the "principle of equality before the law . . . does not

prevent the State from qualifying the rights of the citizen
according to the public necessities."96 Representative Stevens
(R-Pa.) explained that the Fourteenth Amendment "allow[ed]
Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far
that the law which operates on one man shall operate equally
upon all." 97

Representative Hotchkiss (R-N.Y.) understood

the Amendment to mean "no State shall discriminate between
its citizens and give one class of citizens greater rights than it
As a result of the Fourteenth
confers upon another.""
Amendment, states could thus no longer enact or enforce
firearms laws that discriminated against particular "classes
of inhabitants."99 But no contemporary evidence suggests
that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended or understood
to preclude neutral, non-discriminatory regulations.
D. Second Amendment IncorporationComes Before the Court
One glaring omission in the briefs filed on behalf of the
McDonald petitioners is that not one brief discusses the two
cases in which the federal government pressed a Second
Amendment claim by arguing in favor of something like
incorporation. Why would gun rights advocates ignore an onpoint case that argued for Second Amendment incorporation?
If one examines the two cases, United States v. Mitchell and
United States v. Avery, the answer becomes clear.'00 These
cases highlight the historical flaws in the McDonald
petitioners' attempt to erase the relevance of the militia while
creating a constitutional right to self-defense in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 101
95. Id. at 150.
96. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1866).
97. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
98. Id. at 1095.
99. POMEROY, supra note 61, at 150.
100. United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. 251 (1871) (noting, but not addressing,
the division between two lower court judges on the prosecution's Second
Amendment theory); United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1283 (C.C.D.S.C.
1871).
101. The claim of petitioners' amid-that in the Reconstruction era, "[aIrms
were needed not as part of political and politicized militia service," Brief of
Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 73, at 28 (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 258-59 (1998))-is
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Both cases were part of the South Carolina Ku Klux Klan
(KKK) trials-the prosecution triggered by the crimes that
haunted Louis Post. The lead attorney on the cases, U.S.
Attorney Daniel Corbin, developed a strategy to use the
Fourteenth Amendment to pursue the Klan's violations of the
Second Amendment rights of Jim Williams and other
members of the Negro militia. 10 2 The South Carolina KKK
trials were the only instance that the U.S. government
pressed a Second Amendment claim in court by using the
Fourteenth Amendment. The case confounds the categories
of modern Second Amendment analysis; the KKK trials
vindicate the notion of Second Amendment incorporation, but
in a way that hardly fits with the gun rights ideology or
Heller's account of the Amendment.
For gun rights
advocates, the problem is that Corbin and the Department of
Justice prosecuted the Klan for disarming members of the
Negro militia. 103 Even more troubling to gun rights advocates
is that the individual rights self-defense view was
championed by the South Carolina KKK as a justification for
violating the Second Amendment rights of the members of the
Negro militia.
belied by this history. The Brief of Constitutional Law Professors relies on
Akhil Amar's erroneous claim that militias had become irrelevant to Republican
policy in the era of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brief of Constitutional Law
Professors, supra note 73 (citing AMAR, supra note 101, at 258-29). The
importance of the Negro militias was first documented by OTIS A. SINGLETARY,
NEGRO MILITIA AND RECONSTRUCTION (Greenwood Press 1957). For the most

recent vindication of the importance of the Negro militias, see STEVEN HAHN, A
NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE RURAL SOUTH
FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION (2003). The attempt by Academics for

the Second Amendment to dismiss these subsequent events is equally flawed.
The very source that is relied on by the Brief of the Academics for the Second
Amendment describes the Republicans' desire to re-form militias in the South in
early 1868-the precise time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification. See
SINGLETARY, supra note 101, at 7. For additional evidence that the militiabased view did not simply fade away, see the discussion of POMEROY, supra note
61, and accompanying text and the cases discussed infra Part II.D. Moreover,
as Michael Benedict notes, the growing problem posed by the Klan sharpened
conceptions about the meaning of Section One that were inchoate at the time it
was framed. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION:
ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 24

(2006).
102. CORNELL, supra note 1, at 179-80.
103. Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The
South CarolinaKu Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921, 926-27
(1984); see also LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA KU
KLux KLAN TRIALS, 1871-1872, 22-29 (1996).
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Corbin's opening statement laid out a constitutional
theory quite unlike any presented to the Supreme Court in
the McDonald briefs arguing for incorporation of the Second
Amendment.
Here is what Corbin said in his opening
remarks in the trial:
Imagine, if you like-but we have not to draw upon the
imagination for the facts-a militia company, organized in
York County, and a combination and conspiracy to rob the
people of their arms, and to prevent them from keeping
and bearing arms furnished to them by the State
Government. Is not that a conspiracy to defeat the right
of citizens, secured by the Constitution of the United
10 4
States, and guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
In contrast to Justice Scalia, Corbin viewed the right to
bear arms as tethered to the militia. That view made perfect
sense to Republicans trying to restore political stability to the
South. The newly formed Negro militias, heavily armed by
the Republican-controlled Southern governments, not only
helped restore order, but also provided a potent means of
organizing and rallying Freedmen. It was the political power
of the militias, as much as their firepower, that frightened the
man. 1 5 In the end the judges divided over the issue of
incorporation, providing additional evidence that there was
no consensus on this issue in the era of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The true stories of Jim Williams, the Klan, and the Negro
militias can have no place in the McDonald petitioners' or the
NRA's history of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
The argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was about
gun rights, not civil rights, has become a central dogma of the
modern gun rights movement. This fact was made evident in
a remarkable exchange between gun rights lawyer Alan Gura

104. The Case of Robert Hayes Mitchell, Sylvanus Shearer and Others, in
KU KLUX TRIALS AT COLUMBIA, S.C. IN THE UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT COURT 148 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (transcript of the Ku Klux
Trials (1872)). On the newly created Department of Justice's support for
Corbin, see ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS:
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE IN A RACIST SOCIETY, 1866-1883, at
153 (1987) (noting that Akerman was committed to enforcing the rights of
citizens through the Fourteenth Amendment); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE

POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 122-29 (1985).
105. See HAHN, supra note 101.
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(one of the gun rights lawyers in Heller and McDonald) and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
during oral argument in the McDonald case. When asked
if Northern Republicans were averse to restrictive gun
controls laws in the South, Gura boldly claimed that
gun rights ideology was so pervasive that Northerners were
even willing to allow Klansmen to retain their guns. °6 The
KKK cases demonstrate that nothing could be further from
the truth. The Republicans who drafted, debated, and
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment were not blindly progun. These individuals resolutely opposed discriminatory gun
regulations, but favored neutrally applicable ones intended to
promote public safety.'0 7
Rather than acknowledge this history, gun rights
advocates have attempted to rewrite it by eliminating the
Negro militia from the story and casting the Fourteenth
Amendment as if it were written by the most violent and
The radical
radical wing of the abolitionist movement.
individualist conception of the right to bear arms championed
by Lysander Spooner or John Brown has become central to
modern gun rights ideology. 08 It is no surprise that gun
rights advocates treat John Bingham and Jacob Howard as if
they are simply clones of radical Republicans such as Charles
Sumner. While abolitionism was certainly an important
106. For the exchange between Gura and the Seventh Circuit during oral
argument, see List of Documents in National Rifle Association v. City of
Chicago, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=08-4241&submit=
showdkt&yr=08&num=4241 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
107. See id.
108. For the most recent effort to read the Fourteenth Amendment through
the lens of pre-war radical abolitionist thought, see Clayton E. Cramer et al.,
This Right Is Not Allowed by Governments That Are Afraid of the People: The
Public Meaning of the Second Amendment When the Fourteenth Amendment
Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). Although this essay
provides multiple citations to the work of other gun rights advocates, such as
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998), and Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal
Security, PersonalLiberty, and "the ConstitutionalRight to Bear Arms". Visions
of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 341
(1995), it ignores the key work of the most respected authorities on
Reconstruction. For instance, it fails to cite Michael Les Benedict, the leading
authority on Congressional politics during Reconstruction. Benedict noted the
important conservative strains within Republican thought, and expressly
warned about the dangers of viewing the Fourteenth Amendment as the
product of the most radical wing of the Republican party. See BENEDICT, supra
note 101, at 24.
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strand of Republican thought, it was by no means the only
one. Abraham Lincoln's party, it is worth recalling, also had
roots in antebellum Whig thought. Nothing was more central
to this vision than the idea of a well-regulated society, which
was reflected in the expansive theory of the police power that
evolved during the antebellum era. 10 9 As explained below, it
is impossible to understand the Fourteenth Amendment's
connections to the Second Amendment without recognizing
this tradition.
III. STATE REGULATION OF GUNS IN THE ERA OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S ADOPTION

Rather than mark a retreat from the robust regulation of
firearms enacted before the Civil War, the era of the
Fourteenth Amendment's adoption saw no diminution in the
scope of firearms regulation at the state level; indeed, the
scope of regulation actually increased. Although modern
Americans have come to view the Wild West as the
embodiment of a radical gun rights ideology, the high levels of
gun violence in this region spurred among the most farreaching gun control laws in the nation's history. Wyoming
forbade anyone from "bear[ing] upon his person, concealed or
openly, any fire arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits
Similar bans were enacted by
of any city, town or village.""
Arkansas and Texas,"' and other states outlawed the sale of
non-military pistols."'
If one looks at the language of judicial opinions from this
period, the evidence demonstrates not only a continuing
recognition of a robust police power, but an actual expansion
of the scope of permissible regulation. In Hill v. State, the
Supreme Court of Georgia elaborated at great length on the
meaning of the right to bear arms and the proper mode of
interpreting a constitutional text. 113 Needless to say, the
views of the Georgia Supreme Court in Hill flatly contradict
Justice Scalia's claims in Heller. The Hill Court held that:
109. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 86 (1996).
110. Act of Dec. 2, 1875, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. Sess. Laws 352.
111. See Act of Apr. 1, 1881, No. 96, § 1, 1881 Ark. Acts 191; Act of Apr. 12,
1871, ch. 34, § 1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25.
112. Act of Mar. 14, 1879, ch. 96, 1879 Tenn. Pub. Acts 135.
113. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874).
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The language of the constitution of this state, as well as
that of the United States, guarantees only the right to
keep and bear the "arms" necessary for a militiaman. It is
to secure the existence of a well regulated militia; that by
the express words of the clause, was the object of it.. 114
Indeed, in contrast to modern gun rights ideology and the
Heller decision, the Hill Court expressed some puzzlement
over how anyone might arrive at the opposite conclusion: "I
have always been at a loss to follow the line of thought that
extends the guarantee to the right to carry pistols, dirks,
Bowie-knives, and those other weapons of like character,
115
which, as all admit, are the greatest nuisances of our day."
The Hill Court reaffirmed the traditional Blackstonian
method employed by Justice Stevens and rejected by Justice
Scalia in Heller. Rather than apply the Cheshire Cat Rule of
Construction, the Hill Court accepted that the preamble of
the Second Amendment defined its purpose: "The preamble to
the clause is the key to the meaning of it.""' 6 In regard to the
suggestion that the right to bear arms included weapons
possessed for private as well as public purposes, Georgia
continued to treat the term as a legal term of art. "The very
words, 'bear arms,' had then and now have, a technical
meaning. The 'arms bearing' part of a people, were its men fit
for services on the field of battle."" 7 Whatever popular
variation in meaning might have occurred in the decades
after the adoption of the Second Amendment, the Justices of
the Georgia Supreme Court expressed grave doubt that any of
the authors of the Second Amendment would have thought
that "word arms when applied to a people," also included
"pocket-pistols, dirks, sword-canes, toothpicks, [and] Bowieknives."" 1

Nor was Georgia's high court alone in this view. The
Tennessee Supreme Court pursued a similar line of

114. Id. at 474.
115. Id.; cf. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846) (including arguments from gun
rights advocates about the orthodox view of the right to bear arms in
antebellum jurisprudence). For a discussion of how leading commentators in
the era of the Fourteenth Amendment interpreted antebellum case law, see

supra Part II.A.
116. Hill, 53 Ga. at 474.
117. Id.

118. Id. at 475.
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reasoning. 119
According to that court, the Constitution
protected only "the usual arms of the citizen of the
country." 2 ° Justice Scalia's claim that pistols were part of
the ordinary arms of eighteenth-century militiamen is
historically inaccurate.
Yet even if one sets aside this
additional glaring historical error in Heller, the situation by
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption had
become even less favorable to Justice Scalia's claims about
handguns. By this time, weapons such as the pocket pistol
and revolver were clearly not within the orbit of
constitutional protection and could, therefore, be prohibited
altogether. 121 Even the use of protected weapons such as "the
rifle . . . the shot gun, the musket, and repeater," could "be
subordinated to such regulations and limitations as are or
may be authorized by the law of the land, passed to subserve
22
the general good."
Modern debate on the Second Amendment and
incorporation has been deeply anachronistic. 123 In modernday America, one is likely to be either pro-gun or proregulation-yet this Hobson's choice is an artifact of modern
politics.
Earlier generations saw the matter differently.
Prior to the modern era, regulation was the necessary precondition for the exercise of the right to bear arms, not its
antithesis. Pomeroy's views were typical. He was neither a
proponent of gun rights nor gun control in the modern sense;
he was both pro-gun and pro-regulation. It is this position
that has been effectively erased from the pages of history and
it is this ideal that is essential to understand if we wish to
grapple with the connections between the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments. Gun regulation was not inimical to
the Second Amendment during Reconstruction; it remained
the indispensable foundation for its fulfillment as a
constitutional ideal.
As historian Carole Emberton has
documented, Republicans enacted a variety of gun control
regulations in the South, including a prohibition on the sale

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
debate,

See Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871).
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. at 179-80.
For a discussion of the problems with modern Second Amendment
see Cornell, supra note 40.

2010]

THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS

1069

of pistols in the city of Charleston. 124
Such laws were
absolutely necessary to deal with the widespread violence
directed at Republicans and Blacks. Rather than mark an
end to gun regulation, the era of the Fourteenth
Amendment's adoption saw new and unprecedented efforts to
25
regulate guns. 1
Pomeroy's influential treatise echoed the dominant proregulation vision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After
stating the militia purpose of the Amendment, he went on to
declare in unambiguous terms that "this constitutional
inhibition is certainly not violated by laws forbidding persons
to carry dangerous or concealed weapons, or laws forbidding
the accumulation of quantities of arms with the design to use
them in a riotous or seditious manner." 126 There is absolutely
no evidence from this time period to suggest that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to limit the scope of the
state's police powers, including those that allowed the states
to pass non-discriminatory gun regulations aimed at
27
promoting public safety. 1
In McDonald, the NRA and their supporters have ignored
this history altogether. Inspired by Justice Scalia's approach
in Heller, they take the view that an "originalist" reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment simply requires stringing
together a few isolated historical anecdotes and quotes and
using them to reconstruct the original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Only by ignoring the actual
meaning and understanding of the Constitution-as reflected
by the state legislatures that ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, judicial decisions in the post-Fourteenth
Amendment period, and leading treatise-writers of the timecan such a view be maintained. If the Court in McDonald
takes that history seriously, it could only conclude that
regulations like Chicago's would have been constitutionally
124. Carole Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation,17 STAN. L. & POLY REV.
621 (2006).
125. See Brief of Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 48 (Jan. 6, 2010) (No. 08-1521).
126. POMEROY, supra note 61, at 152-53.
127. On the scope of the police power, see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF
THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN

LAW 183-86 (1957); NOVAK, supra note 109; Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights
and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REV. 217 (1984).
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permissible in 1868.
CONCLUSION

The pro-gun rights version of American constitutional
history is resolutely ahistorical.
Rather than try to
understand what the Second Amendment meant to
Americans in the past, it tries to make historical texts choose
sides in contemporary debates over gun control. The great
difficulty in interpreting the meaning of the right to bear
arms is not that technology has changed, but rather that the
political and constitutional assumptions at the root of the
Second Amendment have changed.
Justice Scalia and gun rights advocates believe that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right that
facilitates the possibility of a well-regulated militia. The
Founders and many Americans during the era of the
Fourteenth Amendment saw it in reverse. To have a wellregulated militia, it was necessary to have a population that
was well armed, well trained, and most importantly, well
regulated. The Founders understood the difference between
an armed mob and a well-regulated militia, and this
distinction remained important during Reconstruction, when
paramilitary groups such as the KKK embarked on a
campaign of terror throughout much of the Reconstructed
South. Gun regulation was not inimical to the right to bear
arms for Reconstruction era Republicans; it was the only
sensible foundation for the proper exercise of any such right.
Akhil Amar has argued that the meaning of the Second
Amendment morphed in the era of the Fourteenth
12 8
Amendment from a collective right to an individual right.
While Amar's theory about constitutional change may be
correct, his history is wrong. Amar is surely right that there
was an important change in the meaning and application of
the Second Amendment between the Founding era and
Reconstruction. But the right to bear arms had not been, as
Amar suggests, decoupled from its original militia purpose.
Rather, the scope of regulation increased. While antebellum
courts were divided over the scope of acceptable gun
regulation, courts and leading commentators in the era of the
Fourteenth Amendment's adoption agreed that the individual
128. AMAR, supra note 101.
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state's police powers gave them vast powers to regulate
firearms, including a right to ban pistols, as long as this did
not impair the ability of citizens to keep and bear those arms
most needed for militia service-long guns.
If the Supreme Court is true to history, it ought to
recognize that, by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, handguns were indisputably outside the scope of
protection afforded by the Constitution. This is a view that
even those who supported incorporation would have been
hard pressed to dispute. Applying the logic of the proMcDonald briefs to the laws in place during the era of the
Fourteenth Amendment would have resulted in far more
violence in the Reconstructed South and untold carnage in
If the Roberts Court is
the cattle towns of the West.
genuinely committed to an originalist methodology, it ought
to uphold Chicago's law-a regulation no more restrictive
than many statutes on the books at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment's adoption.

